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THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF DIVERGENT FIRST
AMENDMENT INTERPRETATIONS
Scott C. Idleman *
There is much validity to the notion that differing worldviews and
foundational premises can yield, and in recent years have yielded, highly
divergent interpretations of the First Amendment's religion clauses.' Some
may disagree with this hypothesis, of course, and perhaps such disagree-
ment is itself the product of incongruent starting conceptions and premises.
Be that as it may, it is fairly accepted among legal scholars and especially
social scientists that the discernment of the principles and doctrines of law
can often be difficult to separate from the identity-that is, the exper-
iences, the ideological and religious foundations, the psychological charac-
teristics, and the social, economic, and political profile-of the discerner.2
By comparison, it is rather debatable whether either these worldviews
or interpretations can realistically be situated on a linear spectrum, with the
"religionists" at one end and the "secularists" at the other.3 A better but
decidedly more complex approach might be to envision them within a
multi-axis framework, thereby reflecting the likelihood that there are other
reasonable arrays of interpretive camps, that citizens may embrace some
parts but reject other parts of these interpretive camps, and that citizens
hold their views with differing levels of intensity. Even if one were able to
plot out a genuine multitude of positions, however, it would still leave un-
answered the question of why different judges, lawyers, academics, and the
public vary so dramatically when they strive to interpret the First
Amendment.
* Professor, Marquette University Law School. I would like to thank the AALS Section on
Law and Religion, and Professor Mark Modak-Truran in particular, for inviting me to present this
article at the January 2007 AALS conference. I would also like to thank the Marquette University Law
School for providing assistance during this article's drafting. Finally, and as always, I would like to
thank my wife, Elizabeth, for her enduring support.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...."). This was arguably the central hypothesis of the panel at
which this article was presented. See AALS Section on Law and Religion, Newsletter at 1-2, Dec. 2006,
available at http://www.aals.org/documents/sections/lawandreligion/LawReligionDec2006.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic De-
bates About Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 743 (2005); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise &
Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious
Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004). This is not to say that the written law itself in conjunc-
tion with legal norms and processes do not constrain legal decision-makers, nor is it to discount exoge-
nous influences such as interest groups. For an overview of three standard decisional models
encompassing many of these factors, see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of
Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 774-88 (2000).
3. This appears to have been a key premise associated with the panel's hypothesis referenced
earlier. See AALS Section on Law and Religion, supra note 1, at 1.
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The objective of this article is to address this question by identifying
some of the major conceptual fault-lines beneath the religion clauses' doc-
trinal topography. In particular, it describes two subsurface variables that
meaningfully influence the reading of history and historical documents, the
discernment of principles, the interpretation of prior case law, and, ulti-
mately, the formulation and application of doctrine. These variables are,
first, the unconscious associative perception of religion and, second, the
perceived relationship between the active presence of religion and the vi-
tality of the social and political order. Other important variables exist, of
course, and these are addressed briefly in the concluding part of the article.
I. THE ASSOCIATIVE PERCEPTION OF RELIGION
Likely central to many citizens' views of nonestablishment and relig-
ious liberty are the underlying notions or impressions that they associate,
whether consciously or unconsciously, with the terms religion or religious.
Specifically, what are the unfiltered or immediate thoughts, images, exper-
iences, and emotional responses that these words, in varying contexts,
evoke? The attempt to discern these underlying notions is more than sim-
ply an empirical inquiry into the many possible definitions of religion,
much less a normative argument about how religion ought to be defined or
conceptualized. It is also not to deny that a number of citizens, including
judges and professors, consciously possess fairly systematic or sophisticated
definitions of religion.
Rather, it is a general acknowledgement of two postulates: first, that
human beings, based on a variety of personal characteristics and exper-
iences, harbor presuppositions and prejudices which in turn inform their
unconscious or instinctual conceptualization of religion, their expectation
regarding the characteristics of religious citizens, and their perception of
religion-related claims under the First Amendment, and second, that these
unconscious perceptions and expectations can differ in decisive ways from
the intellectualized, abstract views of religion or religious claimants that
one believes-and is perhaps even convinced-that one holds.4
Needless to say, people can possess a variety of such disjunctions, and
there is nothing especially remarkable about their existence. As one judge
has recognized, "human behavior, which is profoundly affected by the deci-
sion-making process, is both an elaborate process of interpreting, choosing
and rejecting possible lines of action or alternative decision-making in re-
sponse to both the external stimuli being perceived, as well as an expres-
sion of pre-established inclinations and meanings within an individual."
'5
4. Cf. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 (1921) ("Deep
below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the
complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be
litigant or judge."); JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., THE JUDGMENT INTUITIVE 14-34 (1938) (describing the
role of intuition, or "hunches," in the judicial decision-making process).
5. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 10 (1994). "To simplify the complex
flood of information from the world, we tend to categorize objects, people and occurrences into groups,
types or categories-that is, into [what behavioral scientists refer to as] schemata-so that we can treat
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When uncritically possessed by a legal decision-maker, however, these dis-
junctions or their constituent premises acquire an incalculable significance,
for they can unknowingly affect the reading of history, the formulation of
doctrine, and assessment and disposition of real-life claims. Not less im-
portant, they can also be the source of seemingly irreconcilable interpretive
conflicts, such as those that currently attend the understanding of the First
Amendment.6
A. A Closer Examination of the Phenomenon
To illustrate the potential disjunction between abstract conceptualiza-
tion and instinctual perception, consider some of the following terms and
attempt to note the very first, unfiltered associative thought that comes to
mind when encountering each term:
" religious display * religion and politics
" religious oppression 9 religion and abortion
" religious conservative 9 religion and science
For the most part, there are no correct or incorrect associative reactions to
these terms or phrases. One's particular reaction, however, can speak
volumes about one's operative yet subconscious perceptions of religion and
its manifestation in particular contexts.
To illustrate the actual range of meanings that these terms can have,
thereby allowing one to assess one's own interpretations, consider more
closely the term religious conservative. A religious conservative, first of all,
could describe a person who is theologically, liturgically, or dogmatically
conservative within that person's congregation or denomination. Alterna-
tively, it could be a religious person who is socially conservative with re-
gard to the morality of public policies or the legal permissibility of certain
conduct. Or it could denote someone who is not even religious, but who
has a conservative view of the role of religion in politics or public poli-
cymaking, just as a fiscal conservative has a restrictive view of governmen-
tal spending.
Moreover, one cannot tell from the words alone the particular faith or
religion, if any, to which the religious conservative belongs or adheres. It
could be a Roman Catholic who favors the return of the Latin Mass, or a
nonidentical stimuli as if they were equivalent." Id. "Schemata guide this selective filtering of incoming
information by providing a model of what to expect; they tell the brain what information to pay atten-
tion to and what information to ignore." Id. at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
6. To be sure, "the task of giving meaning to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of
the First Amendment has been the source of some of the deepest divisions on the Court." Kathleen A.
Brady, Fostering Harmony Among the Justices: How Contemporary Debates in Theology Can Help To
Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding Religious Expression by the State, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 433, 435 (1999).
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fundamentalist who opposes the teaching of evolutionary theory in public
schools, or an Old School Protestant who opposes same-sex marriage. It
could be an adherent of Orthodox or Conservative Judaism, or a Hindu
traditionalist, or a Muslim member of the British Conservative Party, or an
Old Order Mennonite who abstains from using electricity in the home.
Undoubtedly, there are many more types of religious conservatives
that could be identified. But an exhaustive litany is not necessary to make
the point at issue, which is that what one instinctively and initially envisions
when first encountering the term religious conservative-or any of the
above terms-may shed substantial light on one's predispositions when as-
sessing the meaning of the religion clauses, their application in any given
case, and more generally, the proper role of religion in law in politics.
More significant, for any given individual, is the extent to which these in-
stinctive responses may differ dramatically from what one consciously pro-
fesses to believe, quite sincerely, about religion, religious believers, religion
in public forums, and so forth. It is significant precisely because the indi-
vidual, if he remains unaware of his unconscious biases, will have no incen-
tive to adjust his decision-making, regardless of the possible impropriety of
these biases and despite the adverse consequences that they may have.7
One of the clearest examples of this phenomenon, outside of the relig-
ion context, is that of so-called unconscious racism or implicit bias.8 Con-
sider, for example, the commercial fields of realty and mortgage lending.
As a starting premise, it seems fair to assume that most real estate agents
or mortgage lenders are not self-consciously racist-that is, they do not
perceive themselves as such-and, in fact, that many of them genuinely
agree with contemporary principles of equality. Yet, study after study has
demonstrated that African-American home buyers are often dealt with by
realtors and lenders differently than Caucasian home buyers.9 Similar alle-
gations have been waged with regard to employment decisions,"° traffic
7. See Nugent, supra note 5, at 5 ("[T]hrough this blind faith in their impartiality... judges may
gain a false sense of confidence in their decisions. They may fail to take into account the unavoidable
influences we all experience as human beings and disregard the limits of human nature and the diffi-
culty of bringing to the conscious level subjective motivations, beliefs and predilections."); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61 (2000). For
a proposal to facilitate judges' awareness of biases, see Evan R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1023 (2002).
8. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (explaining the phenomenon and critiquing current equal
protection doctrine which looks only at text, intent, and motive). For a recent review of the social
science literature, see Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foun-
dations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006).
9. See Kerwin K. Charles & Erik Hurst, The Transition to Home Ownership and the Black-
White Wealth Gap, 84 REV. ECON. & STATIsTics 281 (2002) (noting this phenomenon, although also
attributing white-black mortgage-related differences to other major factors); A. Mechele Dickerson,
Caught in the Trap: Pricing Racial Housing Preferences, 103 MIcH. L. REV. 1273, 1281 (2005) (book
review); Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial
Discrimination, 33 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 877, 880 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Decisionmaking, 56 ALA.
L. REV. 741 (2005) (favoring unconscious discrimination claims under Title VII).
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and pedestrian stops (often called "racial profiling"),11 numerous aspects of
the criminal justice system,12 and even retail automobile sales.13
Nor does one always need a formal study to observe the manifestation
of latent or unconscious racism. The 2006 incident involving comedian
Michael Richards-who by all accounts was not previously considered a
racist and did not view himself as such, and yet spewed racial epithets with
the ease of a seasoned Klansman-demonstrates the potency of underlying
beliefs and premises." Even after the incident, Richards insisted "I'm not
a racist. That's what's so insane about this."15
Of course, the breadth and imprecision of the terms religion and relig-
ious may not be the only linguistic reason that different listeners experi-
ence different associative thoughts. Some of the variation may reflect the
flexible interpretability of the other word in each pairing, such as display,
oppression, conservative, and so forth. This can only be a partial explana-
tion, however, for one could readily devise pairings using these latter
words, such as storefront display or fiscal conservative, that would likely
generate similar or comparable images among most if not all listeners. If
that is correct, then one could fairly surmise that these latter words are not
especially ambiguous or fluid, and that the more significant perceptual fac-
tor is indeed the term religion or its variants.
The reality may in fact be that one cannot meaningfully perceive relig-
ion, or that which is or is not religious-and cannot therefore have a per-
spective on nonestablishment or free exercise-unless and until these
notions are filled with and shaped by one's own, potentially subconscious
preconceptions. Illustrative of this point is the colonial Europeans' per-
spective on the religious beliefs and rituals of the original inhabitants of the
Americas. Generally speaking, these settlers did not recognize-and in
many instances could not recognize-the cosmologies of the indigenous
tribes as authentic religions, but instead viewed them as an assortment of
paganistic, heathenish, and fundamentally misguided myths and customs.
After all, the Indian belief systems lacked the "sacred texts, written histo-
ries, and church institutions" that characterized the colonizers' own
faiths.16 Given their own preconceptions about what is or is not religious,
11. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION
SYSTEMS: PROMISING PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED 5-8 (2000) (reviewing anecdotal and empiri-
cal evidence), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1fbja/184768.pdf.
12. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 13, 25-38 (1998) (discussing unconscious racism at the arrest and charging stages); Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988) (discussing
unconscious racism at the trial and sentencing stages).
13. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender, Race and Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104
HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991). For a subsequent, more nuanced study, see Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of
Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of lts Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109 (1995).
14. See Richards Says Anger, Not Racism, Sparked Tirade, MSNBC, Nov. 22, 2006, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15816126/. Richards is best known for his role as the eccentric "Cosmo
Kramer" in the television series Seinfeld, the show famously about nothing.
15. Id.
16. Irene S. Vernon, Religious Rights, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 541,541
(Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 1996) ("The denial of Indian religious liberty arose from the clash of European
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in other words, most of these settlers could not even contemplate the possi-
bility that Indian spirituality was a religion, much less one that should be
treated respectfully or equally under the law.
17
There is little reason to think, moreover, that these types of precon-
ceptions, for better or worse, would not likewise continue to influence a
contemporary decision-maker's treatment and final disposition of religion-
related claims.1 8 (Is it just a coincidence that Justice Hugo Black, who in
his younger years had some affiliation with the KKK, wrote the rather
strong, elaborate, and arguably unnecessary language in Everson v. Board
of Education'9 about the categorically separationist nature of the Establish-
ment Clause and the no-public-aid principle?2") In addition to interpreting
history and formulating doctrine, a variety of functions such as determining
credibility, assigning culpability, and assessing the facts could all be colored
by preconceptions of which a judge and jury, for example, are not even
cognizant. It is true, of course, that most evidence codes include provisions
and Native American worldviews. Christian colonizers evaluated Indian religions from the perspective
of their own particular faiths. They searched for sacred texts, written histories, and church institutions
in Indian societies, and were appalled when tribal religions did not display these characteristics.").
17. See Maureen E. Smith, Crippling the Spirit, Wounding the Soul: Native American Spiritual
and Religious Suppression, in AMERICAN INDIAN THOUGHT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 116, 118 (Anne
Waters ed., 2004) ("Coming out of the context of the Middle Ages, with the Crusades and the Inquisi-
tion, Europeans had very strict ideas about appropriate religious behavior-notions of how to worship
and how to live. These beliefs colored their view of Native religion, leaving them virtually incapable of
viewing the Natives' actions as spiritual.").
18. With regard to American Indian religious freedom claims, in particular, see Allison M. Dus-
sias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twenti-
eth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 805-19 (1997) (discussing
various definitional and conceptual problems); John Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious
Persecution of Native Americans, 52 MONT. L. REV. 13, 16-17 (1991) (contending that "courts do not
understand the nature of Indian religious beliefs because most judges are confined intellectually by
Judeo-Christian notions of what constitutes a religion"; that "[t]his bias is reflected in the judicially
constructed legal doctrines for determining the constitutional validity of religious claims"; and that,
"because these doctrines are framed in Western concepts of religiosity, they are prejudicial to the non-
Western religions of Native Americans ...."); id. at 35 ("The continuing inability of our society to
comprehend and appreciate the religions of Native Americans is reflected in first amendment case law,
both in the results of the cases, which frequently deny Indian religious rights, and in the flavor of the
opinions, which rarely transcend Judeo-christian [sic] notions of religion to grasp the spirituality of
American Indian religions."); Bryan J. Rose, Comment, A Judicial Dilemma: Indian Religion, Indian
Land, and the Religion Clauses, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 103 (1999) (discussing the problems created
by applying Supreme Court jurisprudence to Indian religion cases).
19. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding public busing of both public and parochial school students).
Everson was a 5-4 decision with a judgment that Justice Black's own rhetoric seemed to foreclose. In
fact, "Black reportedly told friends that he made the approval of the aid 'as tight' as possible to render
it a 'pyrrhic victory' for aid proponents." Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State
Relations, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 121,127 (2001) (quoting ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGo BLACK: A BIOG-
RAPHY 363-64 (1994)).
20. See Berg, supra note 19, at 126-29; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56
EMORY L.J. 18, 41 (2006) (noting the view, held by some, "that Everson is at least in part a product of
widely shared (both within and without the Supreme Court) anti-Catholic sentiment"). To be sure,
"Hugo Black Jr.'s memoirs state ... that the one sentiment [his father] did share with the Ku Klux Klan
... was a distrust of the Catholic Church." Berg, supra note 19, at 128 (citing HuGo BLACK, JR., MY
FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 104 (1975); John T. McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the
American Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960, J. AM. HIST., June 1997, at 124).
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modeled after Rule 610 of the Federal Rules of Evidence2 1 that prohibit
consideration of a witness's or party's religious beliefs.2 2 But, again, these
rules can likely have an impact only on the conscious, surficial decision-
making of the judge and juror, leaving much of the significant unconscious
elements in place.
B. The Supreme Court and the Definition of Religion
One possible means of ameliorating the effects of these elements is for
the Supreme Court to issue a meaningful constitutional definition of relig-
ion, at least to the extent that such a definition would override or at least
circumscribe conflicting judicial preconceptions. Notably, however, relig-
ion appears to be one of the few key terms, if not the only key term, of the
First Amendment that the contemporary Supreme Court has not authorita-
tively and comprehensively defined.23 The most that the Court has said, in
relatively dated cases of unknown precedential authority, is that religion
involves a person's relationship to God 4 or "the affirmative pursuit of
one's convictions about the ultimate mystery of the universe and man's
relation to it."'25 Conversely, the Court has explained that the religion does
21. FED. R. EVID. 610 ("Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is
not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the witness' credibility is
impaired or enhanced."). For a comprehensive examination of Rule 610, see Michael Ariens, Evidence
of Religion and the Religion of Evidence, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 65, 77-86 (1992).
22. See ALA. R. EvID. 610; ALASKA R. EVID. 610; ARIZ. R. EVID. 610; ARK. R. EVID. 610; CAL.
EVID. CODE § 789; COLO. R. EviD. 610; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.611; HAW. R. EVID. 610; IDAHO R. EvID.
610; IND. R. EvID. 610; IOWA R. EVID. 5.610; Ky. R. EVID. 610; LA. CODE EVID. art. 610; ME. R. EVID.
610; MD. R. 5-610; MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 223 § 19; MICH. R. EVID. 610; MINN. R. EVID. 610; Miss. R.
EvID. 610; MONT. R. EvID. 610; NEB. EVID. R. 610; N.H. R. EVID. 610; N.J. R. EvID. 610; N.M. R.
EVID. 11-610; N.D. R. EvID. 610; OHIO EvID. R. 610; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2610; OR. R. EvID.
610; PA. R. EVID. 610; R.I. R. EVID. 610; S.C. R. EViD. 610; S.D. CODIFIED L. § 19-14-17; TEX. R. EVID.
610; UTAH R. EVID. 610; VT. R. EVID. 610; WASH. R. EvID. 610; W. VA. R. EVID. 610; Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 906.10; Wyo. R. EVID. 610. Georgia, interestingly, provides that "[rleligious belief shall go only to the
credit of a witness." GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-3.
23. See United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1500 (D. Wyo. 1995) (stating that "the Su-
preme Court has done little to identify positively what 'religion' is for First Amendment purposes"),
affd, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1006 (1997); L. Scott Smith, Constitutional
Meanings of 'Religion' Past and Present: Explorations in Definition and Theory, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTs. L. REV. 89, 91 (2004) (remarking that the Court "has demonstrated an aversion to the task").
24. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) ("The term 'religion' has reference to one's
views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and
character, and of obedience to his will."), overruled on other grounds by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
634 (1996); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163-64 (1879) (similar, invoking the writings of
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson). The Davis conception is perhaps the must elaborate, but it is
doubtful that its theism-based view of religion would be deemed acceptable today. See, e.g., Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (noting, when discussing the scope of the First Amendment, that
"[almong religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the
existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others"). But cf.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 577 (1993) (Souter, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The extent to which the Free Exercise Clause requires
government to refrain from impeding religious exercise defines nothing less than the respective rela-
tionships in our constitutional democracy of the individual to government and to God.").
25. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940), overruled on other grounds by W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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not encompass "purely secular considerations" or "philosophical and per-
sonal" beliefs such as those held by Henry David Thoreau,26 but this cate-
gory remains elusive as well.
Even among the multitude of other Article III judges, past and pre-
sent, only a modest number have ventured into this definitional abyss and
yielded substantial, though not necessarily consistent, definitions.2 7  It
seems, in fact, that many lower courts, when faced with an alleged religion
that is unknown or extremely unconventional, simply assume that it is a
religion for purposes of the case, subsequently ruling against the claimant
on some other basis.28 Legal scholars, by comparison, have produced an
abundance of literature on defining religion,29 but of course their proposals
26. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
27. See, e.g., Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2005) (employing, in part,
an ultimate concern approach and stating that "atheism may be considered, in this specialized sense, a
religion"); United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992) (relying on Welsh and asserting, in
the free exercise context, that "religious beliefs, then, are those that stem from a person's moral, ethical,
or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and are held with the strength of traditional religious
convictions"); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 440 (2d Cir. 1981)
(employing, in part, an ultimate concern approach in the free exercise context); Malnak v. Yogi, 592
F.2d 197, 200-10 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring in the result) (employing, in part, an ultimate
concern approach in the establishment context); Founding Church of Scientology of Wash., D.C. v.
United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (considering criteria such as whether "[iut is incor-
porated as [a religion within its jurisdiction]"; "[i]t has ministers, who are licensed as such, with legal
authority to marry and to bury"; "[ilts fundamental writings contain a general account of man and his
nature comparable in scope, if not in content, to those of some recognized religions"), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 963 (1969); United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1502-03 (D. Wyo. 1995) (holding that
religion under RFRA is identical to religion under the First Amendment, and looking to whether a
claimant's beliefs address "ultimate ideas," are "metaphysical," prescribe norms of conduct, are com-
prehensive, and bear various "accoutrements" of recognized religions), affd, 95 F.3d 1475, 1482-84
(10th Cir. 1996) (adopting the district court's analysis), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1006 (1997).
28. See, e.g., Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1152 (10th Cir. 2001) (atheism),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 997 (2001); Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (humanism); Kun-
selman v. W. Reserve Local Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 931, 931 (6th Cir. 1995) (Satanism); Brown v. Woodland
Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir. 1994) (Wicca); McCabe v. Arave, 827 F.2d 634, 637
n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (Church Jesus Christ Christian); United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820, 824 (lth
Cir. 1982) (Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Haff v. Cooke, 923 F.
Supp. 1104, 1108 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (Identity Christianity); Faheem-El v. Lane, No. 82 C 4404, 1984 WL
717, at *2 n.1 (N.D. I11. June 29, 1984) (El Rukn Science Temple); see also MICHAEL WOLF ET AL.,
RELIGION IN THE WORKPLACE: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND Ac-
COMMODATION 31 (1998) (noting in the administrative context that, "[i]n practice, when an employee
attaches the appellation 'religion' to a set of beliefs, the courts are reluctant to dig beneath the
surface").
29. See, e.g., Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the Constitutional Definition of Religion, 22 CUMB. L.
REV. 1 (1991); Anita Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A Classification Problem, 11 VAL.
U. L. REV. 163 (1977); A. Stephen Boyan, Jr., Defining Religion in Operational and Institutional Terms,
116 U. PA. L. REV. 479 (1968); Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U.
ILL. L. REV. 579; James M. Donovan, God Is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the Definition of
"Religion", 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23 (1995); Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest
Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309 (1994); George C. Freeman III, The Misguided Search for the Con-
stitutional Definition of "Religion", 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in
Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753 (1984); Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarifi-
cation of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233 (1989); John C. Knechtle, If We Don't Know What
It Is, How Do We Know if It's Established?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 521 (2003); Val D. Ricks, To God God's,
to Caesar Caesar's, and to Both the Defining of Religion, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1053 (1993); Jane M.
Ritter, The Legal Definition of Religion: From Eating Cat Food to White Supremacy, 20 TOURO L. REV.
2007] DIVERGENT FIRST AMENDMENT INTERPRETATIONS 75
formally carry no weight in a court of law, which may very well explain the
relative volume of their work.3"
Needless to say, this lack of an authoritative and meaningful definition
is anomalous. Most other operative terms in the First Amendment, such as
establishment,31 free exercise,32 speech,33 peaceable assembly,34 and peti-
tion have been defined or delineated at least by individual Justices if not
by the Court itself.36 Even obscenity-the famous object of Justice Stew-
art's statement that "I know it when I see it" 37-has its own three-part
definition." But not religion. The closest that the modern Court has come
751 (2004); Smith, supra note 23 at 110; C. John Sommerville, Defining Religion and the Present Su-
preme Court, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (1994); Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note, Constitutional "Religion":
A Survey of First Amendment Definitions of Religion, 6 TEX. FORUM ON Civ. LIB. & Civ. RTS 117
(2001); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978).
30. See BEITE NOVIT EVANS, INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION: THE CONSTITU-
TION AND AMERICAN PLURALISM 48 (1997) ("Scholars may debate definitions of religions at leisure,
but when judges do so, their definitions are authoritative acts of state power.").
31. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-98 (1992) (non-punitive coercion); County of Alle-
gheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989) (endorsement); Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (discrimination); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (pur-
pose, effect, and entanglement); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (listing a multitude of
prohibitions).
32. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004) (indicating that free exercise encompasses the
ability engage in a "religious service or rite" without "criminal [ ]or civil sanctions" as well as the right
of "ministers ... to participate in the political affairs of the community"); Hernandez v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (stating that free exercise includes "the observation of a
central religious belief or practice"); Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-82 (1990) (ex-
plaining that free exercise includes "the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one
desires," religious conduct that does not conflict with neutral laws of general applicability, and religious
conduct "in conjunction with other constitutional[ly] protect[ed] [liberties], such as freedom of speech
and of the press or the right of parents to direct the education of their children" (citations omitted));
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981) (free exercise in-
cludes the ability to engage in "conduct mandated by religious belief' or not to engage in "conduct
proscribed by a religious faith" without the resulting denial of an important government benefit); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972) (finding, with regard to Old Order Amish, that free exer-
cise can encompass an entire way of life).
33. See Spence v. State of Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (explaining that speech in-
volves "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message ... and in the surrounding circumstances the
likelihood [i]s great that the message would be understood by those who view[ ] it").
34. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-53 (1875).
35. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 486-90 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring).
36. At least one commentator has written that the Court has also not defined the term press. See
Troy L. Booher, Finding Religion for the First Amendment, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 469, 483 (2004).
The Court has stated, however, that "[f]reedom of the press . .. 'is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets .... The press in its historic connotation
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion." Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938)); see also
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). With
respect, this does appear to be a fairly developed definition, although definition itself can be a contested
concept.
37. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating, in regard to the
process of determining whether expression is constitutionally obscene, that "perhaps I could never suc-
ceed in intelligibly [defining the kinds of material embraced in the Court's prior descriptions of obscen-
ity]. But I know it when I see it ....").
38. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (explaining that a work can be deemed ob-
scene if "'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; ... [if] the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and .. .[if] the work,
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to meaningfully defining religion was its conceptualization of religion
under the conscientious objector exception to the Military Selective Service
Act.
39
At that time, during the Vietnam War, the statute required that a con-
scientious objector's beliefs had to bear some "relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation."4 ° In
United States v. Seeger,4 the Court framed the inquiry as whether this ex-
ception was limited only to conventionally theistic belief systems and, if so,
whether this limitation ran afoul of the First Amendment.42 Then, obviat-
ing the need to address the constitutional issue directly, the Court cre-
atively read the statutory exception as including "[a] sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel
to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemp-
tion."'43 The Court, in other words, adopted what many have described as a
functional approach to identifying religious claims. 4 Yet this rendering
was an act of statutory construction, not an interpretation of the religion
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." (citations omitted) (quot-
ing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972))).
39. Pub. L. No. 80-759, 62 Stat. 604 (June 24, 1948) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 451-471a).
40. 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1958 ed.), quoted in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965).
The statute has since been amended, see 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (2000) ("Nothing contained in this title
shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form. As used in this subsection, the term 'religious training and belief' does
not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code.").
There are also regulations implementing the statute, formerly at 32 C.F.R. pt. 75, but the Department
of Defense recently withdrew them from publication, explaining that "[t]he document on which this
part was based has been revised and is limited only to DoD personnel management matters, affects
only DoD military personnel, and has no impact on the public." Conscientious Objectors, 72 Fed. Reg.
33677 (June 19, 2007).
41. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
42. Id. at 165. According to the Court, "[tihe question is not.., one between theistic and atheis-
tic beliefs .... Our question .. , is the narrow one: Does the term 'Supreme Being' as used in § 6(j)
mean the orthodox God or the broader concept of a power or being, or a faith, 'to which all else is
subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent'?" Id. at 173-74 (quoting WEBSTER'S SEC-
OND NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1958)).
43. Id. at 176; see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (plurality opinion) (elaborat-
ing on Seeger's approach to determining the scope of what qualifies as "religious" under the statute, as
amended after Seeger, for the purposes of conscientious objection). Comparably broad constructions of
the statute have also come from the lower federal courts, see, e.g., United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360,
365 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736, 739-42 (9th Cir. 1969); cf. United States v.
Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
44. A "functional definition focuses on the role that the belief system plays in the life of the
believer .... Oldham, supra note 29, at 145; see also Boyan, supra note 29, at 485-91 (espousing a
similar "operational" definition along with a more traditional definition); J. Morris Clark, Guidelines
for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 340-44 (1969) (assessing this approach); Note, supra
note 29, at 1072-75 (arguing for a functional approach, but only in the free exercise context). A second
definitional approach is substantive or content-based, which "attempts to classify beliefs as 'religious'
depending on specific features" such as theism or a belief in extra-temporal consequences. Oldham,
supra note 29, at 157-58; see also Clark, supra, at 339-40 (describing one substantive approach). Yet
another approach can be labeled analogical, which "attempts to classify beliefs as religious or non-
religious depending on how they compare to those systems of belief that are popularly accepted as
religious from a Western perspective, such as Christianity." Oldham, supra note 29, at 160.
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clauses, and therefore is not per se authoritative as to the latter,45 even
though constitutional considerations likely informed the Court's
construction.4 6
Notably, not everyone is troubled by the Court's apparent unwilling-
ness or inability to define religion for First Amendment purposes. Some
judges and scholars contend that "a succinct and comprehensive definition
of [religion] would appear to be a judicial impossibility. '47 Their only dis-
appointment, one assumes, is that courts and legal academics keep trying to
formulate one. There are also judges and scholars who argue, counter intu-
itively perhaps, that any judicial definition of religion would itself violate
the First Amendment because it necessarily would encompass some belief
systems but not others.4" In turn, those included could invoke the Free
Exercise Clause while those excluded could not, thereby "resurrect[ing] the
very discriminatory treatment of religion which the Constitution sought
forever to forbid.
49
Assuming for the moment that these are not rationales embraced by
the Supreme Court, what then might explain the avoidance of defining re-
ligion under the First Amendment? One immediate response might simply
be a lack of certworthiness or opportunity. After all, the Court's own rules
emphasize the need for a split between or among courts over an important
federal legal issue, so much so that it will "rarely" grant review even "when
the asserted error consists of ... the misapplication of a properly stated
45. See Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Whether Seeger meant to define 'relig-
ion' as used in the First Amendment is doubtful."); United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494,1500 (D.
Wyo. 1995) (concluding that the functional approach invoked in the Selective Service Act cases does
not carry over into the constitutional realm), affd, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
1006 (1997); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 248-49 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority's description of what does not qualify as a religion under the First Amendment is "contrary
to what [the Court] held in .. .Seeger" and Welsh under the Selective Service Act). This is not to
suggest that lower courts have not, in fact, used the functional approach in free exercise cases, see
United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1018 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing cases and observing that "[c]ourts
regularly use the Welsh test to determine whether belief is 'religious' for First Amendment free exercise
purposes"); Loney v. Scurr, 474 F. Supp. 1186, 1193 n.5 (S.D. Iowa 1979) (concluding that "Welsh,
Seeger and like cases can[not] be distinguished on the ground that they involved the interpretation of a
statute" (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961)).
46. See Jesse H. Choper, Congressional Power To Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive
Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 299, 336-37 (1982).
47. Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537, 540 (S.D. Iowa 1973), affd, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974); see also Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th
Cir. 1996) ("Attempting to define religion, in general and for the purposes of the Establishment Clause,
is a notoriously difficult, if not impossible, task."); George C. Freeman III, The Misguided Search for the
Constitutional Definition of "Religion", 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983).
48. See, e.g., Derek Davis, The Courts and the Constitutional Meaning of "Religion": A History
and Critique, in THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN MONITORING AND REGULATING RELIGION IN PUBLIC
LIFE 89, 91 (James E. Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1993); Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture and
Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 604 (1964); Sharon L. Worthing, "Religion" and
"Religious Institutions" Under the First Amendment, 7 PEPP. L. REV. 313, 345-46 (1980); cf. W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 658 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
49. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 658 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Regarding the general bar on interde-
nominational discrimination, see Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,
703 (1994); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449
(1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330
U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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rule of law."' 50 Is there a direct, manifestly evident split between federal
circuit courts or state supreme courts? The answer, of course, is "no," pre-
cisely because so few courts have taken up the matter and because the
Supreme Court has provided so little guidance such that it is basically im-
possible that a lower court would decide "an important federal question in
a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of th[e] [Supreme] Court."'"
Even absent a split or conflict, however, the Court may still grant re-
view if "a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled
by this Court . "..."52 The focus of this last sub-rule is not on whether a
current split exists, but rather on the importance of the federal question
and the likelihood that it will arise again, which is an indication that a split
could very well develop in the future. Under this portion of Rule 10, which
is typically viewed as a sign of appellate desperation when asserted alone,
the case for granting review of the First Amendment definition is the
strongest. It is, without doubt, an important federal question, one that is
posed, explicitly or implicitly, in every nonestablishment and free exercise
claim. Moreover, while the likelihood of a particular marginal claimant or
marginal belief system encountering the legal system might be low, the
likelihood that many such claims or belief systems will collectively face the
courts is a certainty, especially as pluralism continues to flourish and the
inmate population (which generates many of the marginal claims) contin-
ues to grow.
Importantly, the foregoing paragraphs assume that the Court is will-
ing, or would be willing, to undertake and fulfill the task of defining relig-
ion. But this assumption may be wrong. Perhaps, as intimated earlier, the
Court is deliberately avoiding the task, in which case it is obviously impor-
tant to ask why. One possibility is that the Court agrees with those com-
mentators who think that the task is impossible. Standing alone, however,
this explanation seems unlikely, for the Court has often expounded consti-
tutional terms or concepts-such as "person,"53 "cruel and unusual,"54 and
50. Sup. CT. R. 10.
51. Id. 10(c).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (includes illegal aliens); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 157-58 (1973) (does not include unborn); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (includes
illegitimate children); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966) (does not include
states); Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A The-
ory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1452 n.103
(1992) (compiling Supreme Court cases holding that corporations are 14th Amendment persons as to
property rights).
54. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) ("[Plublic perceptions of standards of
decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A penalty also must accord with 'the
dignity of man,' which is the 'basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.' This means, at least,
that the punishment not be 'excessive.' When a form of punishment in the abstract.., rather than in the
particular... is under consideration, the inquiry into 'excessiveness' has two aspects. First, the punish-
ment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, the punishment must not
be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." (citations omitted) (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion))).
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religion's companion term "establishment," 5 to name a few-that are by
no means easy to define. It is, after all, the "province and duty of the judi-
cial department to say what the law is."5 6 Moreover, as the Court has
stated, "[a]lthough a determination of what is a 'religious' belief or practice
entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question,
the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to
make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole
has important interests.
'57
Another possibility is that the Court agrees with these commentators
who contend that defining religion would itself violate the First Amend-
ment. Yet this seems even more unlikely than the first rationale, for the
very inclusion of the word in the text of the Constitution is a strong warrant
for its interpretation, absent a clear constitutional indication to the con-
trary. In this respect, the Court no more contravenes the Establishment
Clause by defining religion than it contravenes the separation of powers by
defining the respective authority of the Congress or the President.58 Be-
sides, if it is constitutionally permissible for the legislative and executive
branches to define religion for regulatory purposes, or for the judiciary to
55. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94
(1989) (announcing that an establishment occurs when the "government... convey[s] or attempt[s] to
convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred" (original quota-
tion marks omitted)); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (stating that an establishment
exists when the government "place[s] its ... coercive authority ... behind a single religious faith or
behind religious belief in general, compelling nonadherents to support the practices or proselytizing of
favored religious organizations"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (explaining that an
establishment arises when a law lacks "a secular legislative purpose," when "its principal or primary
effect" is to advance or inhibit religion, or when it "foster[s] 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion"' (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970))); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of
Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (enumerating a list of criteria for discerning an establishment).
56. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Dick-
son, 40 U.S. 141, 162 (1841) ("[T]he judicial department has imposed upon it by the constitution, the
solemn duty to interpret the laws, in the last resort; and however disagreeable that duty may be, in cases
where its own judgment shall differ from that of other high functionaries, it is not at liberty to surren-
der, or to waive it."). True, there are other constitutional terms that the Court has avoided defining, but
oftentimes these avoidances are characterized as constitutional obligations pursuant to the separation
of powers or federalism. See, e.g., Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 578 (1900) (referring to the guar-
anty of a "republican form of government" in article IV, section 4 of the United States Constitution,
and explaining that "[i]t was long ago settled that the enforcement of this guaranty belonged to the
political department").
57. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (footnote omitted); see also Founding
Church of Scientology of Wash., D.C. v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("Though
litigation of the question whether a given group or set Of beliefs is or is not religious is a delicate
business, our legal system sometimes requires it .... (footnote omitted)); Clark, supra note 44, at 338
(arguing that "the difficulty of distinguishing those who are conscientious from those who are not can-
not obviate the necessity of doing so, assuming .. .that fairness to the conscientious individual is a
major purpose of the free exercise clause"); Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Pro-
posal, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309, 313-16 (1994) (providing several reasons why the Court should define
the term).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its
authority under article I section 8 clause 3 of the United States Constitution); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952) (holding that the President exceeded his authority under
article II of the United States Constitution).
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interpret that term as found in statutes and regulations,59 then surely the
Court itself can define religion within the First Amendment and not
thereby violate the same.60
A third and arguably more plausible theory is that many members of
the Court believe that the term religion, which appears only once but is an
essential element of both religion clauses, should presumptively mean the
same thing under each clause,61 but that this interpretation, in turn, creates
a potential dilemma. On the one hand, the Court is likely concerned from
a practical and normative standpoint about making sure that the Free Exer-
cise Clause encompasses many religions and religious practices, including
non-conventional or emergent ones. 62 To be sure, the Court has admon-
ished that "[t]he determination of what is a 'religious' belief or practice ...
is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice
in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.
'63
On the other hand, the Court is likely also concerned from a practical and
normative standpoint that the scope of the Establishment Clause not be so
broad that the operations of government become unduly hindered due to
increased allegations of endorsement, material advancement, entangle-
ment, or unequal treatment. Yet a generous definition of religion, devel-
oped under and then imported from the Free Exercise Clause, could create
precisely this risk.64 It is not, then, that the task is impossible per se.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (explaining that, pursuant to the
Selective Service Act, the "task [of local draft boards and courts] is to decide whether the beliefs pro-
fessed by a registrant ... are, in his own scheme of things, religious"); Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574
F.2d 897, 901 n.12 (7th Cir. 1978) (explaining that "the proper test to be applied to the determination of
what is 'religious' under [42 U.S.C.] § 2000e(j) can be derived from [Welsh and Seeger], i.e., (1) is the
'belief' for which protection is sought 'religious' in person's own scheme of things, and (2) is it 'sincerely
held"'); Marria v. Broaddus, No. 97 Civ. 8297 NRB, 2003 WL 21782633, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. July 31,
2003) (assessing whether and ultimately holding that "the Nation of Gods and Earths" is a religion
within the scope of the Religious Land Use and Institutional Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to
2000cc-5); but see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319 n.4 (1952) ("[A] governmental decision as to
what constitutes 'a religion' . . . a governmental power to hinder certain religious beliefs by denying
their character as such .... This provides precisely the kind of censorship which we have said the
Constitution forbids.").
60. The Constitution also requires, through its Due Process Clauses, that operative legal terms
"are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently under-
stand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest." U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 549 (1973); see generally Joseph E. Murphy, The Duty of the Govern-
ment To Make the Law Known, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 255 (1982). Certainly it is ironic that the Court's
own interpretations might not satisfy this basic standard.
61. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing); cf. also Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 211 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
62. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology
to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 30 (2000) (explaining that "the Court
appears to agree that a definition like Seeger's might be well-suited for the end of the twentieth century
and that, if anything, America has outgrown even the capacious approach of Seeger").
63. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
64. See Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1537 (9th Cir. 1985) ("To borrow the
ultimate concern test from the free exercise context and use it with present establishment clause doc-
trines would be to invite attack on all programs that further the ultimate concerns of individuals or
entangle the government with such concerns."); Booher, supra note 36, at 470 ("A more expansive
definition of the term 'religion' . . . creates problems in interpreting the Establishment Clause. For
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Rather, there is a consensus among the Justices that the problems poten-
tially generated by defining religion outweigh the benefits of doing so, de-
spite the burdens that this uncertainty might impose on both governments
and prospective claimants.
This dual concern about under inclusion and over inclusion is not lim-
ited to the formal interpretation of the religion clauses. An analogous con-
cern arises for scholars when considering the acceptable role or influence
of religious input in public discourse, largely apart what the First Amend-
ment might dictate. Seeking to ensure that this discourse is rational and
universally accessible, or that the political processes are not unduly divi-
sive, a number of commentators have proposed various self-observed limi-
tations on that input, particularly in relation to the motivations or
justifications for legal or political decision-making.65 Much turns, however,
on one's definition or conceptualization of religion. After all, "the broader
one's definition of religion or religious values, the greater the consequences
of either allowing or disallowing [legal or political decision-makers] to in-
voke religious values in their decision-making." 66 Conceiving of religion
narrowly, thereby keeping the consequences of these extralegal limitations
more manageable, would not be consistent with the contemporary under-
standing of religion. Conceiving of it broadly and then applying these limi-
tations, however, "might cause the [legal and political] process[es] either to
be stripped of all meaningful moral influence or (more likely) to degener-
ate into a medium in which religious values are simply invoked in an ad hoc
and selective manner.
67
C. Interpretive Manifestations of Differing Perceptions
Whatever the Court's reasons for not authoritatively defining religion,
there is little reason to think that such a definition will soon be forthcom-
ing. For this reason, however, it is even more critical to examine in what
ways, and to what extent, various conscious and unconscious associative
example, if a deeply-held, but non-theistic, moral objection to war could qualify for protection under
the Free Exercise Clause, then arguably, the moral theory that generates the objection cannot be taught
in public schools without violating the Establishment Clause. Yet such a result is legally unaccept-
able."); Conkle, supra note 62, at 30 (contending that a broad conception of religion under the Free
Exercise Clause could yield unmanageable effects under both clauses).
65. See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON (2000); BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10 (1980); KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CON-
SCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL
CHOICE (1988); William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (1993); John
Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997); Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep
of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453 (1996); see also ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS
CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS (1996) (advocating such limitations,
though suggesting that they have a constitutional basis).
66. Scott C. Idleman, The Limits of Religious Values in Judicial Decisionmaking, 81 MARO. L.
REV. 537, 539 (1998).
67. Id. at 540; see also Jason Carter, Toward a Genuine Debate About Morals, Religion, Politics,
and Law: Why America Needs a Christian Response to the "Christian" Right, 41 GA. L. REV. 69, 82
(2006) (contending that "if religious arguments are to be excluded because these views are not shared
by all citizens, then much else must also be excluded, making it very difficult to establish any moral or
ethical model for decisionmaking").
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perceptions of religion can affect the reading, doctrinal formulation, and
application of the religion clauses. Indeed, given that the religion clauses
are well-known for having a conflicting historical record68 as well as multi-
ple and imprecise standards, 69 the absence of a definition or conception of
religion only magnifies the probability that these perceptions will be
influential.
With regard to the discernment of relevant history and principles, first
of all, it can obviously be important if the person assessing a First Amend-
ment question predominantly has in mind, consciously or unconsciously,
one type or institution of religion, or one type of religious claimant, as op-
posed to another. In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township,
70
for example, would the Justices' conceptualization of the meaning of estab-
lishment-not their disposition of the case, but their very understanding of
the Establishment Clause-have been different if the parochial benefi-
ciaries of the school transportation plan were primarily Moravian or
Quaker children rather than Catholic children? The Roman Catholic
Church, after all, is a large, hierarchical institution that is historically insep-
arable from the matter of state-established religion and the resulting devel-
opment of principles such as separationism. 71 In turn, it is difficult not to
process the constitutional question without this preexisting empirical real-
ity somehow impacting one's conception and assessment, not just of the
case at hand, but of the meaning and scope of the Establishment Clause
itself.
By the same token, might the Court's intuitive understanding in
Braunfeld v. Brown72 of what it means to prohibit free exercise have been
different if the claimants, rather than being Orthodox Jewish retailers in a
predominantly Christian community that mandated Sunday business clos-
ing, were Christians in a predominantly Jewish community that prohibited
68. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 879 (2005) (positing, after canvassing
the framers' remarks, that "[t]he fair inference is that there was no common understanding about the
limits of the establishment prohibition"); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 577 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (recognizing
that "[t]he scholarship on the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause is ... not uniform");
Vincent Phillip Munoz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and the Impossibility of Its
Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 585-87 (2006) (noting among Supreme Court Justices the
existence of multiple, competing interpretations of original intent).
69. See Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006) (describing the Court's jurisprudence as "both hopelessly confused and
deeply contradictory"); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 57 (2005) (noting "the many equally plastic and contradictory [Establishment
Clause] standards offered by various justices, from neutrality or endorsement, to the Lemon measures
of purposes, effects, and entanglements"); Gregory C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions
Fare in the Courts: Empirical Evidence from Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1021, 1031
(2005) (describing the law of free exercise as "unstable over time and uncertain in application").
70. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
71. See Berg, supra note 19, at 123-51. The Moravians and Quakers, of course, are also histori-
cally inseparable from the matter of state-established religion, but not on the side of establishment. See
Moravian Church in North America, Our History, available at http://www.moravian.org/history/; Onta-
rio Consultants on Religious Tolerance, The Religious Society of Friends, Quaker History, http://
www.religioustolerance.orglquakerl.htm.
72. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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retail operations on Friday evening and Saturday? 73  Or, would the Jus-
tices' broad conception of religious exercise in Wisconsin v. Yoder,74 as en-
compassing not simply a particular practice but an "entire mode of life, 75
have never materialized had the claimants-instead of being the Old Order
Amish, who in the Court's admiring words "singularly parallel and reflect
many of the virtues of Jefferson's ideal of the 'sturdy yeoman' "7 6-been a
longstanding community of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints that similarly refused to send its children to school be-
yond the eighth grade? The point, once again, is not that the cases might
have come out differently, but rather that the Justices' actual comprehen-
sion of the First Amendment's meaning and scope at the outset may have
been different as a result of their underlying and likely unrecognized
preconceptions.
II. THE PERCEIVED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND SOCIETY
A second subsurface variable in the jurisprudence of the religion
clauses is the perceived relationship between religion and society, and in
particular the latter's government and laws. Specifically, does one tend to
view the presence or influence of religion, or of a particular religion, as
either necessary, irrelevant, or deleterious to the proper functioning and
prosperity of society and politics? Alternatively stated, does one believe-
intuitively, or perhaps empirically-that religion is overall a positive, neu-
tral, or negative factor in American life?
77
A. Factors Influencing One's Perception of Religion and State
As with the perception of religion generally, one's sense of the rela-
tionship between religion and government necessarily involves both con-
scious and unconscious dimensions.7 8 It is also the product of many
phenomena.79 Among other things, it can be shaped by one's own exper-
iences, such as family life, schooling, the character of one's community, and
73. Regarding whether the religious affiliation of claimants affects the outcome of their claims,
see Sisk, supra note 2, at 1037-50 (finding and assessing lower success rates for Catholic and Baptist
religious liberty claimants in the federal appeals and district courts).
74. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
75. Id. at 219.
76. Id. at 225.
77. This second variable, in comparison with the first, is often more explicit in the writings of
judges and scholars, see, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL:
RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005); Berg, supra note 19, at 128-29 (noting various Justices' stated
negative views of the Catholic Church); Marshall, supra note 65.
78. More than likely, this second variable is connected to the first. In fact, it is difficult to imagine
that one's overall impression of religion in relation to society and politics would not color, or be colored
by, the religion-related associations or impressions that one harbors.
79. See Nugent, supra note 5, at 8-20 (canvassing a number of factors that may one's perception
or analysis of a given scenario or individual). "Some influences are internal or personal, such as the age,
generation, religion, values, upbringing, temperament, and the physical condition of the judge. Others
are external, such as the culture and norms of the community in which the judge lives, legal and politi-
cal tensions, the megatrends produced by the information society, the extent of the judge's power, the
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one's interpersonal relationships. If one's beliefs or conduct as a youth, for
example, conflict with the religiously-informed ethos of one's community,
thereby leading to anxiety and even confrontation, then one could certainly
develop a skeptical if not unforgiving view of religion as a social presence
and, in turn, a negative perception of religion in political and legal affairs.
Conversely, if one as a youth witnesses or benefits from social reforms un-
dertaken by religious institutions or congregants, then one could certainly
develop a much more positive attitude towards religion in public life.
This perception can also be a product of one's own foundational belief
system or worldview, whether labeled religious, spiritual, cosmological, or
philosophical. If one's church teaches, for instance, that its or its members
presence in the public sphere is vital or beneficial to society,8 ° then one
who adheres to the church's teachings is certainly more likely to view that
public presence in such a light. Or, if one is sufficiently sure that one's
religiously-grounded opinions on public policy matters are correct and wor-
thy of legal or political expression, then one's participation in law and polit-
ics will probably be viewed as inherently beneficial to society. There are, of
course, a variety of psychological factors that can influence the likelihood
that one will actually develop such views, and certainly one's foundational
beliefs may themselves be inspired by these factors. In the final analysis,
however, it seems rather sensible to conclude that one's overarching
worldview could affect one's perception of religion as a societal presence.
This second variable can also be shaped by one's consideration of re-
gional, national, or international events, whether historical or contempo-
rary in nature. 81 One's analysis, for instance, of the French religious wars
of the late sixteenth century, the twentieth-century conflicts in Bosnia-Her-
zegovina, or the ever-tumultuous geopolitics of the Middle East could, in
concert with other factors, imbed in one's psyche a rather jaded view of
religion as a force in social and political events. By comparison, one's ex-
amination of the justice-promoting efforts of the Reverend Martin Luther
King, Jr.-or, conversely, the oppression waged by the atheist Soviet re-
gime-could lead one fairly to conclude that religion is a necessary and
positive component of a free, democratic, and egalitarian society.82
judge's time constraints and access to information, and the rules regulating the manner in which judges
may fulfill their judicial duties." Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted).
80. E.g., Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Doctrinal Note on Some Questions Regard-
ing the Participation of Catholics in Political Life (Nov. 24, 2002) (Roman Catholic Church); First Presi-
dency Urges Citizen Participation, ENSIGN, Apr. 1988, at 77 (Mormon Church); Edward McGlynn
Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy
History and Bad Public Policy, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205, 235-36 (1980) (noting "the deep strain within
contemporary religious groups which ... insists on active, even radical, involvement in politics").
81. Although presented as additional factors, it is doubtful that one's exposure to and interpreta-
tion of such events are not animated and affected, respectively, by the factors mentioned in the preced-
ing paragraphs.
82. Cf. Richard H. Jones, Concerning Secularists' Proposed Restrictions on the Role of Religion in
American Politics, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 343, 391 n.151 (1994) (arguing that "20th Century secular (nonreli-
gious) ideologies that have gained political control-e.g., fascism, communism, and various national-
isms-may present problems" for those who "attempt to show that nonreligious ideologies are socially
more desirable, e.g., less divisive and volatile").
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Current experiences, closer to home, can obviously play an important
role as well, in some cases prompting a modification, conscious or not, of
one's view of religion's proper role in the social order. "[I]n recent de-
cades," as Professor Daniel Conkle points out, "the relationship between
religious perspectives and political ideologies has become unusually direct
and highly visible ... increasingly plac[ing] religious conservatives on one
side and religious liberals on the other."83 So political and polarized had
"their religious differences bec[o]me ... that by the 1980s and 1990s it was
possible to declare the existence of a 'culture war' in American society.
And this culture war included explicitly political and partisan behavior by
the religious combatants, with the competing sides participating more and
more in electioneering, lobbying, and other forms of direct political ac-
tion."84 In addition to potentially "undermin[ing] the claim that religion
warrants distinctive treatment under the Constitution,"85 the resulting
"perception that religious beliefs and political beliefs are closely related"86
may also alter, or may already have altered, one's instinctual sense of the
proper relation of religion and government.
87
Thus far, the examination of preconceptions and attitudes regarding
religion and the social order has focused largely on religion. But differing
underlying perspectives on the political order itself, and especially on the
nature and role of government, can also have significant implications for
one's conception of the First Amendment. For example, a deep-seated
skepticism of majority rule, formed entirely apart from considerations of
religion and state, could obviously predispose one to conceive of the relig-
ion clauses being inherently skewed against the actions of government,
even before one examines the history and application of the clauses. Or,
one who is partial to the political philosophy of Edmund Burke might con-
ceive of the religion clauses in a very different manner, where issues of free
exercise and establishment are necessarily to be harmonized with the sta-
bility of the state.
B. Interpretive Manifestations of Differing Perceptions
This final section will examine how one's view of religion and the po-
litical order might affect one's actual interpretation and application of the
83. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to
Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 31 (2000).
84. Id. (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 31-32.
86. Id. at 31.
87. The close association of religion with political ideology may also prompt changes in how
litigants frame their arguments. See Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the
Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 8 (2002) ("Whether or not such a full-blown
culture war is actually afoot, it does seem that [some] Establishment Clause challenges are, in fact,
makeshift attempts to undermine certain laws not because they are religious per se, but simply because
they enforce traditional morality. Religion, in other words, serves as a proxy for moral conservatism.,
and the Establishment Clause (like the Due Process Clause before it) becomes merely an expedient
armament in the service of reform-minded efforts.").
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
religion clauses. In many instances, the correlations would not be surpris-
ing. If one begins with a generally positive impression of religion's role in
society and politics, then one would be more likely to accept or favor the
interaction of religion and government and to protect religious conduct
from undue legal interference. One's doctrinal formulation, in turn, would
likely provide for limited scrutiny where government unconditionally sup-
ports religion but heightened scrutiny where government hinders religion.
In justifying this formulation, moreover, one would likely find appealing
the potential authoritative sources-be they the words of the Framers, his-
torians, prior courts, or academics-that expound a similar perspective.
One would also tend to discount as extraneous or erroneous those sources
that do not. Presumably the same will be true of one who begins with an
overall negative impression.88
Consistent with the gist of this article, Professor Kathleen Sullivan has
set forth a typology of four general interpretations of the religion clauses-
two for each clause-that in her view track "competing tacit accounts of
the role of religious organizations in a democratic society. '' 89 While these
four interpretive positions are obviously archetypal and not fully represen-
tative of the ambivalence or complexity of many Justices' or citizens' over-
all stances, nevertheless they illustrate quite well the potential relationship
between one's underlying presuppositions and one's conscious understand-
ing of what the religion clauses actually mean. Additionally, while Profes-
sor Sullivan's focus is on religious organizations and not religion or
religions per se, there is arguably sufficient proximity between these con-
cepts that her analysis can be employed in this context.9 ° Accordingly, and
with these qualifications in mind, the remaining paragraphs of this section
will sketch out each of these four positions.
In Sullivan's first conception, religious organizations, unlike other pri-
vate associations, are "unique in their power to interpret the world and
express shared understandings, and to command deep allegiance, fidelity,
88. See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original Under-
standing of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1793-94 (2006) ("One side cites
Madison and Jefferson; the other side cites the defenders of the established church. One side cites the
decision to end direct financial support of churches; the other side cites congressional chaplains and
religious rhetoric by politicians and government officials. At least in political and judicial debates,
neither side makes much effort to take account of the evidence offered by the other side .... ); William
Lee Miller, The Moral Project of the American Founders, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE:
THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 17, 34 (James Davison
Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990) ("[Ljate twentieth-century Americans, riven with conscious and
unconscious partisanship on . . . issues [about religion and the nation's founding], make tendentious
interpretations of the sort.., that run straight through the late twentieth-century debate about 'church
and state,' which debate, in and out of the courts, and on all sides, seems to be marked by nothing
whatever but advocacy, invective, and polemic. Because the founders are important symbols of national
values, citizens of a later time twist them in order to align those revered figures with their own
convictions.").
89. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The New Religion and the Constitution, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1397, 1403
(2003) [hereinafter Sullivan, The New Religion].
90. For an earlier rendition of her framework, with less emphasis on religious organizations as
such, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 449 (2000)
[hereinafter Sullivan, Justice Scalia].
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and obedience from their adherents."91 As such, they effectively "exert a
quasi-sovereign authority over their members, posing a potential rivalry
with the state when religious and secular obligations conflict. '9 2 Fearful of
the subordination of civil law and the ascendance of such organizations via
support by public taxation, however, judges embracing this conception
would tend towards "weak ... enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause
and strong . . . enforcement of the Establishment Clause."93 As Sullivan
summarizes it, "[i]f religion poses the danger of quasi-sovereign competi-
tion with government, then judges enforcing the Constitution should not
afford religious groups special exemptions from general laws, lest anarchy
and balkanization ensue, nor should they permit public subsidies to flow to
religious activities, lest resentment at subsidizing opposing faiths deepen
religious lines of division."94
Under the second conception, "religious associations occupy an inter-
mediate ground between individuals and government, and serve valuable
social and political functions by fostering normative pluralism and episte-
mic diversity. ... "" In order to ensure this role and to prevent "the poten-
tially homogenizing tyranny of the state,"96 however, "government is
uniquely disabled by the Establishment Clause from speaking in a religious
voice or forcing nonconforming citizens to subsidize others' religious ex-
pression through taxation."97 In turn, a judicial embrace of this view of
religious associations, though maintaining the first conception's separation-
ist reading of the Establishment Clause, would entail a more robust en-
forcement of the Free Exercise Clause. "[C]ourts would review strictly
both government refusals to exempt religious associations from general
laws that inhibit their collective expressive practices, and government inclu-
sion of religious organizations within the scope of public subsidies and
sponsorship."98
91. Sullivan, The New Religion, supra note 89, at 1403.
92. Id.; see also United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissent-
ing) ("[I]n the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has always been main-
tained. The reservation of that supreme obligation, as a matter of principle, would unquestionably be
made by many of our conscientious and law-abiding citizens. The essence of religion is belief in a
relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation."), overruled in part
by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
93. Sullivan, The New Religion, supra note 89, at 1404-05; see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE
DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY 116 (1998) (noting the
judicial perception that "citizens who cite religious grounds when they defy the democratically enacted
laws that apply to everyone else are not simply lawbreakers, although they are obviously that too; they
are, in some peculiar sense, placing their will in opposition to the General Will (as Rousseau called it)
and are therefore actively working against the sovereign").
94. Sullivan, The New Religion, supra note 89, at 1405. On the present Supreme Court, Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg, in Sullivan's view, are most closely aligned with this view. See id. Regarding this
conception as it relates specifically to free exercise, see Scott C. Idleman, Why the State Must
Subordinate Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 175 (Stephen M. Feldman ed.,
2000).
95. Sullivan, The New Religion, supra note 89, at 1406.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1405.
98. Id. at 1406. According to Sullivan, "[tihe Justice on the current Supreme Court who takes
these combined positions most consistently is Justice David Souter." Id.
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Sullivan's third conception "sees religious associations as less like
traditional voluntary associations than like ascriptive groups such as those
based on race or gender. On this view, they are entitled not only to protec-
tion from unequal treatment, but also to preferential treatment in order to
offset historical and structural disadvantages."99 In particular, with "the
rise of the welfare state and the secularization of the political process" and
the ensuing emergence of "a wide range of public substitutes for formerly
private and religious provision of education, health care, and charity...
religious flourishing depends not only upon the autonomy of religious insti-
tutions and their negative freedom from government interference, but also
upon their affirmative freedom to participate in the expanded public
sphere . . . ."'o For this reason, enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause
would be relatively strong and enforcement of the Establishment Clause
would be relatively weak. 1 ' The former "protects religion when the politi-
cal branches do not see fit to accommodate conflicting religious practices as
a matter of grace," while the latter "permits religious associations to pre-
serve any preferential legislative accommodations they can eke out, as well
as to partake of the spoils of the modern welfare state on par with their
secular substitutes.'
10 2
Professor Sullivan's fourth and final view of religious organizations en-
visions them "as ordinary interest groups that may participate freely in
politics but should expect no particular judicial solicitude from courts inter-
preting either of the Religion Clauses."'0 3 Religious associations possess
none of the distinctive characteristics depicted in the first three models,
including their "valu[e] to the political order,"'01 4 and practices that are re-
ligiously motivated cannot, in a legally satisfactory way, be separated from
those that are not. 105 In turn, neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the
Establishment Clause is strongly enforced. As described by Sullivan,
"[t]his is the prevailing position on the current Supreme Court, as exempli-
fied by [Employment Division v.] Smith'016 on the free exercise side and
Zelman [v. Simmons-Harris]0 7 on the establishment side," in each of which
the Court "deferred to the outcome of the democratic process, whether it
favored or disfavored religious associations."108
99. Id. at 1408.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 1408-09. At the time of Professor Sullivan's article, "[tihe member of the current Court
who best exemplifie[d] this approach [wa]s Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who... favor[ed] strong free
exercise exemptions, but who also ... vote[d] ... to uphold against establishment challenge voucher-
based state aid to religious schools, no matter how evangelical their missions." Id. at 1409 (footnote
omitted).
103. Id. at 1409.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 1409-10.
106. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
107. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
108. Sullivan, The New Religion, supra note 89, at 1410. In her earlier article, Professor Sullivan
described Justice Scalia as "indisputably the founding father and leading exponent of the fourth posi-
tion." Sullivan, Justice Scalia, supra note 90, at 449.
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These four models provide a helpful means of discerning the practical
effects of one's preexisting conceptions of the relationship between religion
and religious institutions, on the one hand, and society, politics, and law, on
the other hand. Even they do not exhaust the matter, however. As stated
in the variable's formulation, one may also hold different views of relig-
ion's social and political utility depending on the particular religion that
one has in mind. It has been argued, for example, that some progressive or
liberal critics of conservative religious participation in politics (e.g., the so-
called Religious Right) seem not to be as critical of otherwise comparable
participation by religious clergy or groups that are advocating more agreea-
ble causes, such as civil rights and anti-poverty programs.' 0 9 Likewise, it
has sometimes appeared as if those who seek to maintain or increase the
role of religion in the public sphere, or who are critical of the church-state
separationism that peaked in the 1960s and 1970s, are likely thinking of
their own religious participation and are (or would be) less enthusiastic if
another religion, one quite different from their own, were either to become
more prominent in the legal and political spheres or to reap significant ben-
efits from public funding programs.11 °
III. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment, as the Supreme Court recently remarked,
''contains no textual definition of 'establishment,' and the term is certainly
not self-defining.""' For the most part, the same could also be said of the
accompanying terms religion and free exercise. What this definitional or
conceptual void necessarily invites, and for many decades has yielded, is
the competing invocation of historical sources, principles, and precedents,
and ultimately the formulation and application of divergent tests and
standards." 2
As this article has illustrated, what this void also invites-and, indeed,
what these competing invocations to an extent represent-are differing
109. See CARTER, supra note 77, at 45-49, 58-65 (contrasting the generally positive treatment
given to religious involvement in the civil rights or antiwar movements of the 1960s, the election of
Jimmy Carter in 1976, and the antinuclear movement of the 1980s with the generally negative treatment
given to religious involvement in the anti-abortion or anti-gay-rights movements of the 1980s and
1990s).
110. See, e.g., Andrea Pallios, Note, Should We Have Faith in the Faith-Based Initiative?: A Consti-
tutional Analysis of President Bush's Charitable Choice Plan, 30 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 131, 146-47 (2002)
(noting conservative Christian opposition to receipt of public funding by non-mainstream religions).
111. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 874-75 (2005).
112. Even the operative structure of the joint bar on establishment and free exercise prohibition-
whether it should be read and conceptualized as one clause or two-is contested. The former is the
conventional position, but some scholars have called that position in question. See, e.g., Stephen L.
Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and State, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 293, 311 (2002) ("Despite
what courts and commentators say, the First Amendment contains only one religion clause, not two,
and the text will not admit of an interpretation that tries to assign two different meanings to the word
religion, which appears only once."); Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90
MICH. L. REV. 477, 478 n.8 (1991) ("treat[ing] the First Amendment as containing a single, coherent
Religion Clause whose establishment and free exercise provisions are both in the service of the same
fundamental value: religious freedom").
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subconscious associative perceptions of religion and differing perceptions
of religion's normative relationship to the social order. These, of course,
are not the only underlying variables that can influence one's interpreta-
tion of the religion clauses. For example, one's intuitive perception of cul-
tural or religious pluralism, be it empirically or normatively rooted, could
also shape one's understanding of free exercise or establishment, just as it
might one's understanding of concepts such as equal protection. Interest-
ingly, the assimilation of First Amendment developments may itself bring
about the conscious or unconscious modification of how one believes the
religion clauses ought to be interpreted.
The extent to which one seeks to discern the effects of these variables
on one's own conceptualization of the religion clauses is obviously a matter
of individual choice. Some of them, as a practical matter, may be essen-
tially imperceptible. To discern them, moreover, does not mean that one
will modify their influence, even if one is aware of potentially adverse con-
sequences that they may have. Identifying these variables is certainly a
necessary first step, however, to making the interpretive conflicts of the
religion clauses less perplexing and perhaps, in time, more reconcilable.
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